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A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law:  
The Case of Medicaid Eligibility Waivers  
David A. Super
ABSTRACT
Administrative law is fundamentally a regime of soft power.  Congress, the President, administrative 
agencies, civil servants, and the courts all operate within a broad consensus for rational, good-
faith decisionmaking.  Congress grants agencies discretion, and courts and civil servants defer to 
agencies’ political leadership based largely on the expectation that the latter are seeking to honor 
statutes’ purposes.  That expectation of prudential restraint also allays concerns about delegations of 
legislative power.  When the executive systematically disregards that expectation and seeks single-
mindedly to maximize achievement of its policy objectives, deference’s justification breaks down. 
Across agencies, the Trump administration has disregarded the assumptions on which 
administrative law’s soft power consensus depends.  Its waivers allowing states to deny Medicaid 
to otherwise eligible low-income people unable to find employment exemplifies this disregard. 
Exploiting a sweeping delegation of authority to test new ways to achieve Medicaid’s goal of 
providing health care coverage, this administration has instead sought to achieve very different 
goals, from legislation that Congress has rejected.  The waiver applications themselves estimate 
substantial increases in the numbers of uninsured people.
Ignoring the administration’s disregard of the longstanding administrative law consensus could 
deter future Congresses from valuable delegations of discretion.  Permanently abandoning the 
deferential soft-power model would seriously undermine future governance.  Instead, courts and 
civil servants should treat this period as a hiatus in consensus for good-faith decisionmaking. 
Courts should suspend deference and other aspects of soft-power jurisprudence.  And civil servants 
should comply with political officials’ lawful directions but should remain steadfastly truthful in 
their words and actions. 
AUTHOR
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law, more than any other branch of public law, has always 
been characterized by a delicate mix of hard and soft power.  Political 
appointees can overrule career staff, but the system makes that cumbersome, 
and they rarely do.  Though career staff can substitute their own policy 
preferences for those of their agencies’ political leaders, the system makes that 
difficult, and they rarely do.  And Congress can override agencies’ 
interpretations of statutes, but scarce resources make that difficult, and it rarely 
does. 
Courts, too, have developed a nuanced approach toward exercising soft 
power to vindicate important norms.  To be sure, courts have maintained a 
formidable arsenal of hard-power weapons, but they make a point of rarely 
using them.  Many of the most celebrated administrative law cases involve 
courts deferring to the substantive or procedural judgments of agencies.  Even 
in those relatively rare cases in which courts do interfere with an agency’s 
actions, the Court has made a point of not precluding the agency from 
persisting in its chosen course.  For example, the Court rejected the SEC’s first 
foray against the Chenerys,1 but it carefully left the door open for future agency 
sanctions on a different theory.  The Court then demonstrated that this really 
was a soft-power regime when it affirmed the SEC’s actions after the case came 
up a second time.2  For their part, agencies typically take the hint: For example, 
although the Court did not construe federal statutes as prohibiting highway 
construction through Overton Park,3 its strong skepticism was enough to get 
the Department of Transportation to change course.4 
The maintenance of a soft-power regime of administrative law depends 
on broad structural consensus.  Career staff must accept the legitimacy of 
political appointees; political appointees must assume that career civil servants 
will take seriously their directions, subject to constraints of law and feasibility 
but not personal ideological disagreement; and courts must believe that 
agencies’ actions reflect the considered judgment of career officials making 
good-faith efforts to follow the law. 
  
1. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
2. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). 
3. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971). 
4. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(affirming agency’s subsequent rejection of road). 
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In several ways, this structural consensus depends significantly on the 
repetitive nature of administrative law interactions.  Career staff know that, 
over time, they will have to work with political appointees of both parties; their 
success and longevity depends on being perceived as honest brokers by 
whomever the political process sends their way.  In addition, when they find 
particular appointees’ guidance distasteful, they can look forward to new 
political masters whose preferences are more to their liking.  Congress refrains 
from overturning every action it dislikes because it does not want to 
demoralize agencies it needs to carry out its initiatives in other areas.  Courts 
assume that agencies will not act outlandishly lest they damage their 
reputations and imperil their chances in inevitable future litigation on other 
issues. 
It follows, then, that when this structural consensus frays, the soft-power 
regime of administrative law will become unworkable.  This is particularly 
true when key actors cease to be, or cease to regard themselves as, long-term 
repeat players.  Instead of a heavily iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which rational 
players will quickly begin to cooperate, we move to individual games, in which 
the incentives to defect are quite powerful. 
This Article argues that we have entered such a period of dissensus about 
the structure of the administrative state.  The Trump administration, in word 
and deed, has rejected the broad structural consensus about the means and 
limits of administrative law that have existed since the New Deal.  Perhaps even 
more crucially, the administration has acted and seemed to act in ways that are 
temporally discontinuous from its predecessors and from any successors that 
do not share its policy views.  This president is often sharply estranged from 
much of his own party, has faced catastrophic polling since his early days in 
office, and is under an investigation that threatens his ability to serve out his 
term.  He has faced unprecedented turnover among his political appointees.5  
Only the naïve would believe that his administration expects sufficient repeat 
interactions with other important actors to constrain its behavior.  Moreover, 
high-level officials have bragged about their insubordination to journalists and, 
in an anonymous op-ed, have suggested a total breakdown of crucial 
  
5.  Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Why Is Trump’s Staff Turnover Higher Than the 5 Most Recent 
Presidents?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-is-
trumps-staff-turnover-higher-than-the-5-most-recent-presidents 
[https://perma.cc/Q2D3-8FBT]. 
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assumptions of deference and respect for the rule of law within the 
administration.6 
This collapse in structural consensus requires a suspension, although not a 
termination, of the soft-power model of administrative law.  In particular, the two 
main institutional guardians of administrative legality and continuity—the 
courts and career civil servants—can and should adopt a far less deferential 
approach to this administration’s actions of questionable legality.  Fortunately, 
our system of administrative law provides ample means both for responding to 
this extraordinary situation while it lasts and for returning to the soft-power 
regime of administrative law when the emergency passes.  This course is far 
superior to either ignoring the current administration’s fundamental 
discontinuity from its predecessors, on the one hand, or making permanent 
changes to a basically sound regime of administrative law, on the other. 
To make this argument more concrete, this Article focuses on one of the 
many exceptional actions this administration has taken: using the Social 
Security Act’s section 1115 “demonstration project” authority to encourage 
states to impose “work requirements” on Medicaid recipients.  This Article 
begins with a brief description of this action and the questions concerning its 
legality.  It then moves on to consider the tools available to the judiciary to 
check this action.  From here, it assesses how civil servants might plausibly 
respond.  Finally, it looks ahead to how various possible responses will position 
administrative law when the present conditions pass. 
I. MEDICAID, SECTION 1115, AND “WORK REQUIREMENTS” 
The Medicaid statute does not allow otherwise eligible people to be denied 
coverage for noncompliance with work requirements in most circumstances7 
and prohibits both federal and state agencies from narrowing statutory 
eligibility criteria.8  On January 11, 2018, however, the Trump administration 
released policy guidance announcing its receptivity to states’ requests for 
  
6.  Philip Rucker et al., ‘The Sleeper Cells Have Awoken’: Trump and Aides Shaken by 
‘Resistance’ Op-Ed, WASH. POST, (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/the-sleeper-cells-have-awoken-trump-and-aides-shaken-by-resistance-op-
ed/2018/09/05/ecdf423c-b14b-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.bb76fefb74c0 
[https://perma.cc/7C53-53KS].  
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1(b)(3) (2012) (allowing states to terminate Medicaid only for adults 
whose TNAF-funded cash assistance is terminated for violation of work rules). 
8. See id. § 1396a(a)(8) (requiring provision of Medicaid with reasonable promptness to all 
applicants meeting federal eligibility criteria); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 
(interpreting similar language in former Aid to Families with Dependent Children statute 
as barring states from adding eligibility conditions).  
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waivers to impose “work requirements” on Medicaid recipients.9  The next day, 
it approved the first such waiver for Kentucky.10  It subsequently approved 
similar ones for Indiana,11 Arkansas,12 and New Hampshire.13  It has at least 
eight more pending.14   
A. Section 1115: “Demonstration Project” Authority 
Congress added section 111515 to the Social Security Act in 1962.16  
Subsection (a)(1) provides that for “any experimental, pilot, or demonstration 
project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting 
the objectives of [the Act’s cash assistance, child support enforcement, or 
Medicaid titles] in a State or States . . . the Secretary may waive compliance with 
any of the requirements of [many of the eligibility-creating sections of those 
titles], as the case may be, to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to 
enable such State or States to carry out such project.”  Section 1115(a)(2) also 
allows states to claim federal matching funds for expenditures on these projects 
that would not otherwise qualify under programmatic rules.  The resulting 
policy changes are commonly termed “1115 waivers.” 
  
9. Letter From Brian Neale, Dir., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7GP-HSUK].  
10. Letter From Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Adam Meier, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Matthew Bevin (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://kaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/kentucky-1115-memo-and-
approval-ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVK8-GGWW]. 
11. Press Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Approves New Healthy Indiana 
Medicaid Demonstration (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/02/02/ 
hhs-approves-new-healthy-indiana-medicaid-demonstration.html [https://perma.cc/CX7B-
HTYM]. 
12. Letter From Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Asa 
Hutchinson, Governor of Ark. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-works-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QEH-86ZF].  
13. Letter From Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to Henry D. 
Lipman, Medicaid Dir., N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (May 7, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/ 
1115/downloads/nh/nh-health-protection-program-premium-assistance-ca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S5YY-AS8P]. 
14. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and Pending Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 27, 2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
issue-brief/which-states-have-approved-and-pending-section-1115-medicaid-waivers 
[https://perma.cc/2NX4-UEBE]. 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012). 
16. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare at the time of 
this section’s enactment, described it as a minor administrative provision that 
would facilitate research.17  For its first quarter century, that is all it was.  A state 
might, for example, test the effects of a different benefit calculation formula on 
work incentives or of making payments directly to landlords (rather than 
directly to households) on eviction rates.  Researchers would analyze the 
project’s results, with particularly promising ones giving rise to proposals to 
Congress or the federal agency for policy changes. 
Late in the Reagan administration, however, some enterprising White 
House officials recognized section 1115’s potential to allow states to change 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in ways the 
Democratic Congress was unlikely to approve.  These 1115 waivers sometimes 
operated statewide; the policies they implemented, such as harsher penalties for 
families with very young children, were not so much ones whose impact was 
unknown as ones for which no national political consensus existed.  The 
George H. W. Bush administration continued and expanded section 1115’s role 
in circumventing recipient protections in the AFDC statute.18  President 
Clinton, having campaigned on “welfare reform” but having great difficulty 
crafting legislation that reconciled his various promises, felt unable to restrict 
the availability of waivers and indeed hoped they could buy off disgruntled 
governors who were pressing for enactment of Republican welfare bills.  By the 
time the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
199619 repealed AFDC, the program’s rules were still in effect in a shrinking 
minority of states.20 
Several administrations relied on 1115 waivers to promote Medicaid 
managed care.21  The George W. Bush administration encouraged states to seek 
1115 waivers to subsidize employer-sponsored coverage for low wage workers, 
to expand pharmaceutical coverage for the elderly, and to narrow benefits to 
fund expanded coverage.  The Obama administration briefly explored granting 
1115 waivers to expand the range of activities that could meet cash assistance 
  
17. See Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, 20 PUB. 
WELFARE 191 (1962). 
18. Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare 
“Reform”, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993); Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 
1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 8 (1994). 
19. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. 
20. See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program 
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271 (2004). 
21. See generally Michele Johnson & Kristin Ware, Medicaid Expansion by Any Other Name: 
Exploring the Feasibility of Expanded Access to Care in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 1 
BELMONT L. REV. 119 (2014). 
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work requirements but quickly backed down when Congress objected.  All 
these waivers, however, operated within the basic frameworks of the programs: 
to promote self-sufficiency (in the case of cash assistance programs) and to 
expand access to health care (in the case of Medicaid). 
Indeed, even within those purposes, these administrations refrained from 
using section 1115 as a substitute for legislation.  Thus, either the Clinton or 
Obama administrations could have used section 1115 to establish near-universal 
health coverage regimes similar to those they instead asked Congress to enact: 
Although administrations customarily have insisted that waivers to be budget-
neutral to the federal government, section 1115 does not require that.  Doing so 
would have had ample legal and political precedent.  The fact that neither even 
considered that sort of aggressive exercise of hard-power in pursuit of their 
highest priority demonstrates the strength of the norms of the pre–Trump 
administrative state.  Casting aside those norms would have permanently 
damaged their relationships with Congress, the courts, and the civil service, 
which would be unthinkable for administrations seeing themselves as repeat 
players.   
B. “Work Requirements” 
Although most people assume that a “work requirement” is designed only 
to punish those who refuse to accept available employment, the term has 
changed dramatically over the years to refer to time limits on public benefits.22  
For example, section 6(o) of the Food and Nutrition Act,23 which the Trump 
administration’s policy guidance on Medicaid waivers24 praises, is entitled 
“work requirement” but in fact imposes a firm three-month cutoff of food 
assistance to unemployed recipients without any requirement that recipients 
unable to find private employment be offered a chance to work in exchange for 
further assistance.  Despite generous financial incentives to do so, only a 
handful of states have committed to offering time-limited recipients unpaid 
community work opportunities as a means of maintaining eligibility for 
benefits.25  Further evidence that low-income people unable to find private 
  
22. David A. Super, Opinion, ‘Work Requirements’ for Public Benefits Are Really Just Time 
Limits, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
super-work-requirements-20180115-story.html [https://perma.cc/6V83-E37L]. 
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2012). 
24. See Letter From Brian Neale, supra note 9.  
25. ED BOLEN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MORE THAN 500,000 ADULTS 
WILL LOSE SNAP BENEFITS IN 2016 AS WAIVERS EXPIRE 12 n.21 (2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/more-than-500000-adults-will-lose-snap-
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employment will simply be denied aid comes from the Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) program, which was enacted on the promise that it 
would make recipients work for their benefits.  Instead, states simply denied aid 
to desperately poor people.  Twenty years after the 1996 welfare law created 
TANF, states operated only 15,007 “workfare” slots nationwide.26 
Even when the state ostensibly commits itself to providing opportunities 
to work for those unable to find private-sector jobs, bureaucratic shortcomings 
cause large numbers of people to be sanctioned improperly.27  Because of fiscal 
crises brought on by the Great Recession, states have radically shrunk their 
eligibility staffs and closed numerous local offices.  The highly automated and 
centralized agencies that remain lack the capacity to match recipients with 
work sites, determine qualifications for exemptions based on physical or 
mental limitations, sort out problems caused by lost or stolen mail, or perform 
the rest of the labor-intensive chores required to run work programs.   
Although the various states seeking Medicaid “work requirement” waivers 
may have different things in mind, some states appear to intend policies like 
those applied to childless adult SNAP recipients:  disqualifying people whether 
or not employment is available to them.  The administration’s guidance 
appears to invite that, and Kentucky’s waiver seems to allow it. 
Independent analysts and even supporters of the new requirements to find 
and keep employment conclude that states will not provide recipients 
opportunities to work in exchange for continued benefits.  In analyzing a 
House-passed proposal to disqualify several million more unemployed SNAP 
recipients, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that 
states will be operating only 110,000 unpaid work slots per month by the end 
of the tenth year after enactment.28  Similarly, Kentucky estimates that tens of 
  
benefits-in-2016-as-waivers-expire#_ftn10 [https://perma.cc/XT5Y-NQYX] (Colorado, 
Delaware, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin).  Some states have failed to keep public 
commitments to provide work slots for those that would be denied aid for which they are 
otherwise eligible. 
26. David A. Super, Opinion, The New Republican Farm Bill Will Dismantle Our Programs to 
Feed the Needy, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2018, 4:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/ opinion/op-
ed/la-oe-super-farm-bill-snap-20180511-story.html [https://perma.cc/95DE-9J5N].  
27. See HANNAH KATCH ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, TAKING MEDICAID 
COVERAGE AWAY FROM PEOPLE NOT MEETING WORK REQUIREMENTS WILL REDUCE LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES’ ACCESS TO CARE AND WORSEN HEALTH OUTCOMES (2018), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-18health2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
QZK7-QS4R]. 
28. Dottie Rosenbaum, 6 Takeaways From CBO Estimate of House Agriculture Committee 
SNAP Proposals, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 3, 2018, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/6-takeaways-from-cbo-estimate-of-house-agriculture-
committee-snap-proposals [https://perma.cc/W3U7-NP46]. 
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thousands of people would lose eligibility under the Medicaid waiver that the 
Trump administration just approved.29  Initial data from partial 
implementation of Arkansas’s Medicaid waiver found thousands of people 
disqualified.30 
C. Legal Problems With the Administration’s Waivers 
The administration’s waiver policy, and the individual state waivers that 
its Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is approving, raise 
several serious legal problems.  First, they do not seem to “promot[e] the 
objectives of” the Medicaid statute.  
Second and related, the administration’s embrace of these waivers 
represents a complete reversal of CMS’s prior interpretation of section 1115 as 
not allowing these waivers because they tend to reduce Medicaid coverage.   
Third, approving a waiver for Kentucky the day after the administration 
announced that it would approve such waivers, and others soon afterwards, 
ensures that the waivers did not comply with section 1115(d)’s requirement for 
public hearings and engagement on proposed demonstration projects. 
Fourth, these waivers are inconsistent with Congress’s resolution of the 
question of work requirements for Medicaid,31 which allows termination of 
Medicaid only for adults who received cash assistance under the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant32 who “refus[e] to work,” 
and even then, only for so long as such refusal continues.  These limitations on 
Medicaid termination reflect clear congressional intent to limit denials of 
health care.33  Proposed legislation to repeal and replace the Affordable Care 
Act would have allowed states to impose such limitations, but that bill failed in 
Congress.34  Thus, instead of exploring new policies that might prove of interest 
  
29. JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, KENTUCKY WAIVER WILL HARM 
MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES 2 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-
16-18health.pdf [https://perma.cc/X638-A2JB]. 
30. Robin Rudowitz & MaryBeth Musumeci, An Early Look at State Data for Medicaid Work 
Requirements in Arkansas, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.  (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.kff.org 
medicaid/issue-brief/an-early-look-at-state-data-for-medicaid-work-requirements-in-
arkansas/ [https://perma.cc/BWJ3-PGF9].  
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
32. Id. §§ 601–15.  
33. See Camacho v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 408 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2005). 
34.  Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They Will Not Vote on Health Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/mcconnell-
obamacare-repeal-graham-cassidy-trump.html. 
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to Congress, these waivers merely resuscitate policies Congress has already 
rejected.   
Finally, the plausibility of these waivers as genuine demonstration projects 
is dubious: The administration’s letter is gauzy about what sort of evaluation is 
required, and any plausible research objectives would be better served by 
changing the rules only for the people whom researchers wish to study, leaving 
the rules unchanged for a “control group” of others.  If the administration 
approves all pending waivers, it will have changed basic eligibility policies for 
people representing almost 15 percent of national Medicaid enrollment,35 far 
more than is needed to test any research hypothesis.  Because the waiver 
authority is limited to demonstration projects, the absence of a serious research 
design likely renders the waivers ultra vires.  To be sure, the AFDC and 
Medicaid waivers earlier administrations granted crossed the statewideness 
threshold, drawing mixed reactions from the courts.36  Although some of these 
earlier waivers are open to some of the same criticisms lodged here, they came 
in the context of an administrative law regime in which all parties felt some 
obligation to moderate their actions to preserve a broad legitimating consensus.  
They also did not directly contradict an explicit statutory policy of Congress.37 
Particular proposed waivers that the administration is entertaining show 
even more starkly the absence of a serious research agenda.  Several proposals 
come from states that have refused to accept the Affordable Care Act’s 
expansion of Medicaid.  This expansion sought to ensure that families whose 
incomes are too low to qualify for the Act’s premium tax credits could get 
health insurance through Medicaid.  In non-expansion states, even a very 
modest job can render a family ineligible for health insurance, with too much 
income to qualify for Medicaid and too little to qualify for premium tax credits.  
As a result, if those states implement “work requirement” waivers, recipients 
  
35. See May 2018 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, MEDICAID.GOV (2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid-and-chip-enrollment-
data/report-highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/MH4J-66QD] (providing most recent state 
Medicaid enrollment data); Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and 
Pending Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2018) 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/which-states-have-approved-and-pending-section-
1115-medicaid-waivers/?utm_source=web&utm_medium=trending&utm_campaign= 
waivers [https://perma.cc/PWY7-XEAZ] (identifying twelve states with pending or 
approved work requirement waivers).  
36. Compare Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding grant of statewide waiver 
arbitrary and capricious in absence of clear justification in record), with C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying a more lenient standard). 
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E)–(G) (2012) (finding that lacking insurance causes severe 
adverse economic and social effects).  
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who do not find jobs will be sanctioned off of Medicaid and those that do find 
work risk being terminated for being over-income.38  When Mississippi, a non-
expansion state with some of the lowest Medicaid eligibility limits in the country, 
candidly stated that the purpose of its waiver was to reduce costs, CMS apparently 
directed the state to remove that language from its waiver application to preserve 
the illusion of an experiment in how to achieve Medicaid’s purposes.39 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SOFT-POWER HIATUS 
Courts justify the general regime of deference to administrative agencies 
by relying on the assumption that the executive branch is ordinarily seeking to 
adhere to the law.  In such situations, the executive generally should be given 
latitude to act in the manner it thinks best.  This approach remains viable, 
however, only if the courts rescind deference when the underlying assumption 
of good faith is violated.  If the courts do not treat fidelity to law as a precondition 
to deference, they have little justification for retaining judicial review at all.  At 
that point, they are not so much deferring to administrative interpretations and 
exercises of discretion as they are transferring legislative power from Congress to 
the president.  This gives administrations little incentive to take the law 
seriously and misleads a public that naturally assumes that courts vet 
challenged actions before upholding them; the impression of judicial 
endorsement thus impedes democratic connection and risks enmeshing the 
courts in electoral politics. 
Courts recognizing this problem might apply a variant on the formula 
Justice Jackson suggested in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer 
concurrence.40  Agencies’ powers would be greatest when they demonstrated a 
  
38. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, many Medicaid recipients whose incomes increase beyond 
their states’ pre-expansion eligibility limits may receive six months, or possibly twelve 
months, of “transitional” coverage.  Unless the recipient either loses the job or receives 
raises sufficient put her or him above the poverty line, however, that job would render her 
or him ineligible after a maximum of one year.  CMS has discussed including a limited 
extension of transitional eligibility in “work requirement” waivers for non-expansion 
states, but the fundamental problem still remains:  the very activity that the waivers 
demand endangers beneficiaries’ access to health coverage. 
39. Colby Itkowitz, The Health 202: Mississippi Quietly Amends Its Medicaid Work 
Requirement Waiver, WASH. POST: POWERPOST (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2018/08/09/the-health-202-mississippi-
quietly-amends-its-medicaid-work-requirement-waiver/5b6b0fdb1b326b0207955fca/?utm_ 
term=.b0744b559a16 [https://perma.cc/TWN3-ZCA5]. 
40. 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
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serious effort to discern statutes’ meaning and generally engage in diligent fact-
finding with procedural openness.  The U.S. Supreme Court effectively 
embraced this approach in United States v. Mead Corp., which limits Chevron 
deference to cases in which the agency makes policy through inclusive 
procedures and those in which Congress demonstrated a desire for the agency’s 
rules to have the force of law.41 
Shared structural norms are at least as important as specific legal rules 
in establishing the rule of law in the administrative state because legal rules are 
written against the background of the then-prevailing normative ideology.  
Dangers of legal rules being misused that are possible only under other 
normative systems are either not considered in the legislative process or, if 
raised at all, are dismissed as paranoid. 
We have never previously seen the systemic rejection of the administrative 
state’s structural consensus that characterizes the current administration.  The 
closest analogies come from individual agencies’ occasional efforts to disregard 
the usual checks and balances.  Perhaps the best-known of these is the Social 
Security Disability Insurance crisis of the early and mid–1980s.  There, the 
Reagan administration set out to purge huge numbers of people from the 
rolls despite serious demonstrable impediments to work.  It sought to 
leverage the deferential standard of review for the Social Security 
Administration’s (SSA’s) decisions to cover denials and terminations 
motivated far more by fiscal concerns than by a serious evaluation of the 
evidence.42  As this became apparent, the courts, including the Supreme Court, 
came to believe the SSA was not making a sincere effort to administer the 
existing legal regime.43  As a result, courts developed a range of extraordinary 
deference-rejecting doctrines.44  Perhaps the most striking example of this was 
in Bowen v. City of New York, with the Supreme Court finding that SSA had 
adopted secret lawless policies rendering the formal review process all but 
meaningless.45  These extraordinary measures did not metastasize to damage 
the rest of administrative law, and indeed they were largely absent from SSDI 
law just a few years later once the agency discontinued its defiance.   
  
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
41. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
42. See DAVID A. SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 1202–06 (2017) (describing the Reagan purge 
and the backlash it generated). 
43. See, e.g., Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1988); Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 
294, 298 (2d Cir. 1987); Wier ex rel. Wier v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 956–57 (3d Cir. 1984). 
44. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 275, 278 (8th Cir. 1986). 
45. 476 U.S. 467 (1986). 
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On a smaller scale, the D.C. Circuit in the late 1990s and early 2000s came 
to regard the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ treatment of Native American trust 
accounts as utterly lawless and imposed startlingly intrusive remedial measures 
on the entire Interior Department.46  Many, although not all, federal circuits 
regarded the Bush administration’s restructuring of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals as producing systematically lawless decisions and embraced special 
presumptions against agency regularity.47  Each of these episodes saw a sudden 
collapse of longstanding regimes of deference and witnessed dramatic, if 
relatively short-lived, expansions in the scope of remedies courts were willing to 
employ.  As the agencies disregarded the soft-power constraints from other 
players in administrative law, the courts responded with hard power of their 
own. 
This Part examines three tools available to courts to restrain potentially 
lawless agencies.  It argues that these tools merit modification during periods of 
systematic disregard for the administrative state’s norms. 
A. The Anti-Delegation Doctrine 
In a pair of cases decided in 1935, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
may not delegate effective lawmaking power to the executive branch without 
meaningful standards that constrain the exercise of that power.48  The Court 
has not explicitly invoked the anti-delegation doctrine to decide a case since 
1935, but it has declined numerous opportunities to dispense with it altogether.  
Justices at both49 ends of the ideological spectrum have invoked it in separate 
opinions.  Justice Rehnquist provided the fifth vote for invalidating an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation with a 
concurrence concluding that OSHA’s statute violated the anti-delegation 
doctrine.50 
The Court has kept this doctrine in reserve for addressing a serious 
emergency.  That emergency has arrived.  The courts should recognize that the 
current administration’s reading of section 1115 as authorizing it to disregard 
statutory requirements with which it disagrees at least raises serious 
  
46. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
47. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005). 
48. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
49. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 271–80 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
50. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the result). 
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constitutional questions51 about whether section 1115 is an unconstitutional 
delegation of the power to make law.52  Accordingly, the courts should interpret 
section 1115’s requirements strictly to require good-faith demonstration 
projects limited to the scope necessary to test a plausible research hypothesis. 
For the Court not to invoke the doctrine in these circumstances would 
raise the question of whether it could ever be used at all: If the current situation 
is not sufficiently problematic to justify invoking these reserved judicial powers, 
then situations that would justify invoking them must be so spectacularly rare 
as to undercut these powers’ very justification.  Indeed, if the anti-delegation 
doctrine is regarded as one that no rational court would invoke, its only role 
will be to empower some possible future irrational Court. 
Formally, the disposition of anti-delegation claims has depended on 
whether the challenged statutory standard constrains executive action 
sufficiently as to avoid a delegation of legislative powers.53  Given the 
remarkable gauziness of the statutory provisions the courts have upheld against 
challenges under the anti-delegation doctrine, the unspoken question is 
whether adherence to the normative administrative law consensus combined 
with these statutory limits suffices to make executive activity effectively non-
legislative.  Thus, for example, section 1115’s authority only effectively 
constrains administrative action if “promoting the objectives of” the Medicaid 
statute is a standard with meaning:  If an administration feels free to substitute 
its own purposes for those of the statute then section 1115 becomes every bit as 
open-ended a license to rewrite duly-enacted statutes as was the line-item veto 
struck down in Clinton v. City of New York.54 
Many battles over the anti-delegation doctrine have involved systemically 
important statutes: wage-and-price controls for the whole economy,55 the 
authority of major agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)56 
and OSHA57 to act, sentencing in all federal criminal cases,58 and so forth.  Yet 
some of the most sweeping delegations occur in numerous “safety valve” 
  
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (requiring courts to adopt 
plausible readings of statutes that avoid substantial constitutional questions).   
52. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down statute authorizing 
president to designate provisions of appropriations and tax law that would not be 
followed). 
53. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & 
Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). 
54. 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998). 
55. See generally Yakus, 321 U.S. at 414; Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 737. 
56. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
57. Industrial Union Department, 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result). 
58. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
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provisions of federal statutes that grant sweeping powers to executive agencies 
for use only in very limited circumstances, such as natural disasters,59 focused 
research projects,60 unanticipated trade conflicts,61 or threats to national 
security.62  These provisions’ narrow substantive scope allows both Congress 
and the courts to worry less about administrative overreach.  These provisions 
can serve valuable purposes at the frontiers of governance, where Congress’s 
capacity to anticipate needs is at its weakest.   
These provisions’ continued viability, however, depends on ensuring that 
they remain limited in scope.  Their very open-textured character could allow 
administrators to transform them into Trojan horses, radically redirecting 
substantive law without congressional approval.  When administrators abuse 
limited-purpose grants of authority in that way, they prompt future Congresses 
to rethink the wisdom of enacting such broad legislation and thus threaten the 
sustainability of these safety valve provisions.  These safety valve provisions’ 
benefits would also be lost if a court invoked the anti-delegation doctrine to 
invalidate them outright. 
Increasingly, however, the Court has sought to assuage the concerns 
underlying the anti-delegation doctrine through less absolute means.  It has 
restricted who may exercise particularly broad, potentially problematic 
delegated powers.63  It has read other constitutional provisions formally to 
block some sweeping delegations64 and make others politically uncomfortable 
by denying Congress any control in the execution of laws other than by 
enacting new statutes.65  And although the Court has said in dicta that agencies 
cannot save delegations with limiting constructions,66 the courts can certainly 
do so under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.67  The Court has 
constrained delegations to prosecutors with various plain-statement rules;68 it 
could do so for executive officials more generally.   
Under this latter approach, the Court could require a plain statement in 
the relevant statute that executive discretion is intended to reach the outer 
  
59. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(h) (2012). 
60. Id. § 2026(b). 
61. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 550 (1976). 
62. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010); United States v. Hammoud, 
381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004). 
63. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). 
64. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (invalidating line-item veto). 
65. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (disallowing role for congressional 
appointee); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (disallowing legislative veto). 
66. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
67. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979). 
68. United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 610 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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limits of its constitutionally permissible powers before concluding that a 
sweeping delegation was intended.  Absent such legislative direction, the courts 
would interpret the statutory limits on agency discretion fairly, rather than 
deferentially.  Thus, for example, the courts would actually seek to determine 
the purposes of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and whether Medicaid 
work requirement waivers plausibly advanced those purposes, rather than 
assuming that that vague language was intended to empower the agency. 
In these cases, judicial intervention paradoxically increases executive 
flexibility in the long term by obviating the need for Congress to purge statutes 
of the authority being abused.  Courts often vindicate exercises of executive 
power in order to keep free the hands of future administrations rather than 
because of any particular merit in the action at hand.  Here, striking down 
abuses of these sweeping delegations can provide the reassurance for Congress 
to continue granting such powers in the future.  Congress can only safely 
include them in statutes if it has confidence that executive officials will exercise 
this power with restraint and that, when they utterly fail to do so, courts will 
insist.  The failure to do so will cause many of them to be withdrawn over time, 
which does not serve the public interest well at all.  Thus, a judicial check on 
abuses of delegated executive authority will, in the middle and long term, 
actually expand executive power, or at least legitimate exercises of that power.   
If the courts ignore blatant attempts to reverse congressional decisions 
through section 1115, future Congresses are likely to feel the need to repeal or 
radically restrict that section in order to make their judgments stick.  Section 
1115’s complete demise would undermine its core purpose:  evidence-based 
policy development.  A more constructive approach would be for courts to 
invoke constitutional avoidance to interpret the statutory requirements for 
such waivers—that they be actual demonstration projects and that they be 
consistent with the purposes of the Social Security Act—as precluding attempts 
at executive nullification of congressional choices.  This would lead to 
disallowing the waivers imposing new work conditions on Medicaid eligibility 
on the grounds that they effectively reject decisions Congress took in 1996 and 
2010 and seek to revive legislation defeated in 2017.  In the same vein, courts 
invoking constitutional avoidance could disallow these waivers because they 
represent efforts to change policy on a broad basis rather than a serious effort to 
learn about new policies’ impact through discrete, rigorous, experiments. 
The alternative—deferential acceptance of executive authority to rewrite 
statutes—is as unsustainable as it is subversive of the separation of powers.  If 
President Trump can nullify congressional decisions to extend Medicaid 
benefits, future presidents could override limits Congress has decided to 
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impose on eligibility for benefits.  A wide range of factors—from safe housing 
to good nutrition to education—have been found to improve health outcomes.  
If the current waivers pass muster, no principled basis would exist to stop future 
administrations from allowing states to expand food assistance or housing 
programs with Medicaid funds under section 1115.  Broad deference to 
executive actions under authority as sweeping as section 1115 could readily lead 
to chaos, with wild policy swings each time the White House changes hands.  
Courts using constitutional avoidance and the anti-delegation 
doctrine to rein in section 1115 waivers would also have the salutary effect 
of inducing Congress to play a more active role in considering and making 
policy.  This likely would result in executive moves being either ratified or 
rejected.  An administration seeking to test policies that fundamentally 
alter a program’s course would have to seek congressional approval, 
perhaps in the program’s annual appropriations act.  This would be in keeping 
with Justice Jackson’s admonition in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer69 that 
the extent of executive power should depend on the extent of congressional 
support. 
B. Substantive Review 
In exercising substantive review of radical waivers under section 1115, 
the courts should recognize that familiar doctrines of deference are ill-suited 
to the task.  Ordinarily, agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they are charged 
with implementing often receive strong deference from courts, and agencies’ 
exercises of delegated discretion are reversed only if found to be arbitrary and 
capricious or abuses of discretion.  These doctrines’ premises are that the 
executive is permitted to adapt the legislative regime to different priorities and 
points of emphasis, but that it is not permitted to break with the regime it 
inherited, absent new legislation.  This is sometimes a difficult line to draw.   
No such difficulty exists, however, when an administration makes a 
major, high-profile effort to enact legislation, repeatedly fails, and then exploits 
a delegation of exception-making authority to make many of the same changes 
via administrative law.  No deference is appropriate when an administration 
seeks to accomplish through administrative reinterpretation what Congress 
refused to do through legislative amendment.  Thus, for example, had President 
Clinton responded to the defeat of his health care reform proposal with new, 
expansive interpretations of the Medicaid statute—or section 1115—to 
  
69. 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952). 
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accomplish the same thing, courts should have shown him no deference.  
Similarly, when the current administration responded to the defeat of its 
legislation to reduce eligibility for Medicaid and health care premium subsidies 
by reversing longstanding interpretations to achieve the same thing, the courts 
should recognize this as an attempt at overturning rather than interpreting the 
will of Congress.  The administration’s numerous actions, many of 
questionable legality,70 with the avowed purpose of impeding implementation 
of the Affordable Care Act, confirm that restricting health care subsidies, 
notwithstanding Congress’s refusal to repeal that Act, is its objective, not 
sincere policy research.  
As a threshold matter, Chevron deference—the doctrine that when a 
statute does not address an issue, the courts should defer to any “reasonable” 
agency interpretation—should not even come up with regard to these 
interpretations of section 1115, because the Medicaid-waiver approval process 
is far less deliberative or inclusive than those that the Court has said merit 
Chevron deference.71  In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court limited this 
heightened deference to cases of express or implied delegations of lawmaking 
authority to administrative agencies.72  “It is fair to assume generally that 
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it 
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the 
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such 
force.”73  The Court identified these as formal adjudication, formal rulemaking, 
and notice-and-comment rulemaking, all of which provide for extensive 
participation by the affected parties in shaping the agency’s statutory 
interpretation.  The Department of Health and Human Services has never 
promulgated substantive rules setting out its understanding of what section 1115 
allows, and the process by which it makes those decisions ad hoc on particular 
waivers is far less formal or inclusive than those the Court recognized as worthy 
of broad deference.  
Even if Chevron did apply, these waivers would not merit deference.  The 
Court sometimes justifies Chevron deference by arguing that Congress likely 
intended for the agency, rather than the courts, to resolve ambiguities.74  This 
likely is true when the agency in question is playing the kind of role Congress 
  
70.  Nicholas Bagley & Abbe R. Gluck, Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/trump-obamacare-illegal.html.  
71. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
72. 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001). 
73. Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).  
74. Id. at 227. 
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could plausibly have envisioned.  Congress knows that some future 
administrations will be of the opposite party and, when choosing ambiguous 
terms in legislation, surely takes into account the power it is granting to future 
administrations with divergent policy preferences.  Congresses cannot so easily, 
however, be charged with the knowledge that a future administration would 
operate wholly outside the long-term structural consensus.  Many of the 
administrative state’s implicit checks and balances operate only over an 
extended period, for instance when agencies refrain from indulging their short-
term preferences in order to maintain credibility in the future.  When an 
administration demonstrates a short-termer’s attitude that effectively frees it 
from those constraints, courts seeking to honor Congress’s expectations must 
apply more searching review to replace those constraints.  Similarly, just as one 
basis for deferring to exercises of administrative discretion is the belief that they 
are informed by superior capacities for fact-finding, when fact-finding is found 
to be dishonest and distorted, exercises of interpretive discretion, even those 
not explicitly dependent on that fact-finding, should be questioned. 
The simplest basis for scrutinizing section 1115 waivers is to determine 
whether they are “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of” the Medicaid 
statute.75  Although courts operating within the post–New Deal structural 
consensus commonly shy away from seeking to ascertain the objectives of 
legislation,76 here the task is not difficult.  The administration claims that working 
promotes health and that the statute’s purpose is improving health.  Neither of 
these assertions is straightforwardly true.  Medicaid’s purpose is expanding 
health insurance coverage, which seems contradictory to a plan expected to deny 
coverage to tens of thousands of people in Kentucky alone.  As amended by the 
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is particularly focused on achieving as nearly 
universal coverage as possible to minimize the inefficiencies that result 
when hospitals and others provide large amounts of care for which they are 
not compensated.  Increasing the ranks of the uninsured certainly does not 
accomplish that. 
In addition, routine application of tools of statutory construction—a 
prerequisite to Chevron  analysis77—also suggests that section 1115 cannot be 
interpreted to support the new waivers.  Section 1931 of the Medicaid statute 
shows that Congress knows how to craft work requirements and has chosen to 
do so in only a very limited way.  Legislative silence ordinarily is entitled to little 
  
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012). 
76. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Are Medicaid Work Requirements Legal?, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
763 (2018) (approaching these questions within the post–New Deal consensus). 
77. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
1610 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590 (2018) 
	
	
weight because it has no recognized standing within the terms of the U.S. 
Constitution and because any number of factors can lead to a bill’s failure 
(including, most commonly, the legislature’s failure to focus fully).  The defeat 
of multiple efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act is not mere 
ordinary legislative silence: These efforts had extreme salience, and they 
were clearly defeated on their merits.  This makes clear that the 
administration is acting at the nadir of its power, in opposition to past 
Congresses that enacted and amended the Medicaid statute over the years, and 
with no support from the current Congress that chose not to disturb that 
statute.  Thus, “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,”78 the 
courts may discern a congressional intent inconsistent with the current 
administration’s reading of section 1115.  
Doctrines for reviewing exercises of executive discretion also demonstrate 
how anomalous the new Medicaid “work requirement” waivers are.  Even 
absent the systemic failures we are now experiencing, Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe79 encourages courts to infer purposes from 
legislative text and to override administrative actions that either consider 
illegitimate factors or disregard mandatory ones.  This approach is especially 
apt for applying a statute that specifically requires adherence to its “objectives.”  
The administration’s desire to reverse its congressional defeat is about as illicit a 
purpose as one can readily imagine; its failure to consider the individual and 
systemic consequences of increasing the ranks of the uninsured is similarly 
unacceptable under Overton Park.  This administration’s 180-degree reversal of 
its predecessors’ determination of the appropriateness of waivers of this kind 
also runs afoul of the principle that changes in direction require clear 
explanations of what has changed and why the evidence relied upon in prior 
determinations should not dictate continuing the prior policy.80  And the 
absence of any explanation why these “demonstration projects” need to operate 
statewide, rather than with discrete treatment and control groups, is just the 
sort of irrationality that courts often find arbitrary and capricious.  Even before 
the current administration, and even on issues not recently addressed by 
  
78. Id. 
79. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
80. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009), disclaims any substantive preference 
for the prior rule, but it does not dispense with agencies’ obligations to explain their 
analysis of the evidence and policy considerations supporting the policies they reverse. 
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Congress, courts have occasionally invalidated waivers when serious policy 
research did not appear to be the motivating factor.81 
Courts weighing section 1115 waivers can learn from their predecessors’ 
response to the Reagan administration’s purge of the Social Security disability 
rolls in the 1980s.  The “substantial evidence” standard of review applicable to 
those cases is little different from the “arbitrary and capricious” standard courts 
will apply to waivers.  Just as the courts of the 1980s concluded that no 
termination of benefits was supported by substantial evidence unless the agency 
showed either that the initial grant of benefits was erroneous or that the 
recipient’s medical condition had improved significantly,82 and that medical 
conclusions contrary to the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician needed 
solid support,83 today’s courts could establish similar elaborations of what is 
“arbitrary and capricious” in the waiver context.  For example, they could 
recognize a presumption that waivers are arbitrary and capricious if they 
purport to test policies that Congress has explicitly rejected by statute or if 
they remove congressionally-conferred benefits statewide rather than for a 
discrete treatment group.  
C. Procedural Review 
Procedural review of agencies’ actions balances the agency’s substantive 
goals with concern for fair and accurate processes.  Under ordinary 
circumstances, courts assume that agencies can readily reconcile these goals.  
When, however, the substantive needs are exceptionally strong, they may 
overwhelm procedural concerns such as the need for a pre-deprivation 
hearing84 or allowing the public time to adjust before a new regulation takes 
effect.  Thus, when affected persons have sued to set aside agencies’ actions for 
failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, other statutory or 
regulatory procedural requirements, or procedural due process, the Court has 
been willing to subordinate those procedural concerns to genuine public 
  
81. Newton-Nations v Betlach, 660 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 2011); Beno v Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th 
Cir. 1994).  
82. See, e.g., Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1982). 
83. See, e.g., Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1992). 
84. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598–600 (1950) (allowing 
seizure of allegedly misbranded dietary supplements prior to a hearing); Fahey v. 
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250–54 (1947) (allowing merger of insolvent financial institution 
without a pre-deprivation hearing because of the danger of further losses during any 
delay); cf., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607–09 (1974) (finding danger to 
disputed property justifies denial of pre-deprivation hearing). 
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emergencies, especially when it believes that the agency has a high likelihood of 
being correct on the merits.85 
Although less explicitly established, the reverse should also be true: When 
procedural concerns are especially severe, they should overwhelm the usual 
deference to the agency’s choice of substantive goals.86  For example, although 
Vermont Yankee87 generally prohibits courts from mandating additional steps 
in notice-and-comment rulemaking beyond those specified in section 553 of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, it does make an exception for extraordinary 
circumstances.88  One such circumstance is compelling evidence that the 
agency is not acting in good faith, as when an agency seeks to override 
legislation it disfavors through the regulatory process.   
Vermont Yankee’s general prohibition of judicially-crafted additional 
procedures does not apply to judicial review of the Medicaid work requirement 
waivers, because the agency has altogether declined to engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking to promulgate its new Medicaid eligibility policy.  
Moreover, Congress has established additional procedural requirements for 
policymaking through section 1115.  Courts can and should determine 
whether waivers were issued in compliance with these requirements as well 
as whether additional development of the record is needed to determine 
whether a waiver meets section 1115’s substantive requirements. 
Separately, HBO v. FCC89 held that, when the volume and intensity of ex 
parte communications render the formal agency record illusory, the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions allow courts to 
demand that the agency give a full public airing of concerns.  As one waiver was 
approved only one day after the administration announced its new policy, and 
others followed soon thereafter, the formal record of these actions obviously 
does not tell the real story.  Reviewing courts should thus vacate waivers 
granted under these conditions and direct the agency to reconsider its decisions 
through new proceedings that produce a record actually reflecting what the 
agency is considering.  At a minimum, courts should not confine the record on 
  
85. See, e.g., Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 611–13 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing agency to 
dispense with notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement budget-cutting legislation 
timely); Phila. Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 882–85 (3d Cir. 1982) (same). 
86. To do otherwise would effectively concede that substantive needs are inherently superior 
to procedural ones, which makes little sense as a matter of either the APA’s text or 
sensible norms. 
87. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
88. Id. at 542. 
89. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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review to the items formally presented to the agency when other information and 
motivations obviously drove the rapid decisions.  
The substantive needs of agencies must be constantly balanced with the 
mandate of procedural regularity.  Courts recognize that exceptional 
substantive needs sometimes require subjugating procedural ones.  The reverse 
should also be true: When procedural irregularities are severe, they should 
override routine, nonemergency substantive objectives. 
III. THE CIVIL SERVICE IN A SOFT-POWER HIATUS 
As Jon Michaels has powerfully demonstrated, in the administrative 
state’s implicit separation of powers, career civil servants hold responsibilities 
closely analogous to those of the courts under the constitutional separation of 
powers.90  With protected tenure, career civil servants are expected to uphold 
the rule of law and to protect systemic interests that transcend the agenda of 
any particular administration.  Indeed, much of their power derives from the 
courts: Not only do the courts enforce civil service laws to shield them from 
politically motivated dismissals, but the standard of review strongly favors 
administrative actions crafted by career bureaucrats over those thrown together 
by political appointees.  When career bureaucrats write thorough notices of 
proposed rulemaking and meticulously respond to all comments received, 
courts commonly find adherence to the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-
and-comment requirements.  More generally, bureaucrats are well positioned 
to amass the combination of data and arguments that persuade courts that 
decisions were not arbitrary and capricious.91 
In ordinary times, this process is constructive: Input from civil society and 
norms of legality filter through civil servants to produce decisions within the 
general terms set out by political appointees.  In the current environment, 
however, political appointees are driving an ideological agenda that respects 
neither Congress’s legislative choices nor the input of civil society.  For 
bureaucrats to perform their usual roles in this environment would not be to 
  
90. See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 60–61 (2017).  
91. In Michaels’s framing, civil society’s role in the administrative separation of powers is 
analogous to the role of Congress in the constitutional separation of powers representing 
the diversity of social opinion on a given topic.  Most directly, political appointees in 
administrative agencies mirror the role of the president in the constitutional system, 
initiating policy decisionmaking and focusing debates with specific proposals.  Just as civil 
servants derive much of their power from the support of the courts, civil society’s influence 
comes at least in part from its ability to mobilize factions within Congress, and political 
appointees derive their power from the president’s support.  
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develop public policy but rather to obscure the processes behind it.  Giving the 
appearance that public comments were considered when in fact they were not, 
or that expertise shaped a decision when it did not, creates a false record that 
can only mislead courts and, ultimately, the electorate.92  Not only are 
bureaucrats not required to do this, but their oaths to uphold the Constitution 
and laws of the United States forbid them from doing so.93 
The Rules of Professional Responsibility provide an appropriate guide to 
the obligations of civil servants, even non-lawyers.94  This metaphor, of course, 
requires a judgment about who should be regarded as the “client,” but civil 
servants’ oaths are to the United States, not to their current political officials.  
Even to the extent that those officials are seen as having authority to say what 
the goals of the government are, civil servants, like attorneys, may pursue their 
clients’ goals only through lawful means.  To give a false aura of deliberation95 
to politically preordained decisions is tantamount to engaging in a coverup. 
In attempting to honor their obligations to the nation as a whole, rather 
than their current political masters, civil servants should consider several 
concrete steps, each entirely legal.  First and most obviously, they should 
maintain scrupulous honesty in everything they write, both for internal and 
external consumption.  If they do not believe that the research supports a 
particular proposition, they should not write that it does.  This does not mean 
that civil servants need to be abrasive or obstructionist or that they need 
constantly to oppose political appointees’ decisions.  But civil servants should 
not pretend that such decisions reflect the views of career staff or that they 
were driven by factors that they were not.  This honesty is a service to the 
political appointees—keeping them from losing track of which decisions 
were political calls and which were genuine expertise-driven policies that they 
can expect career staff to defend to their successors in future administrations. 
  
92. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 (2009). 
93. Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 
(2018) (arguing that many bureaucrats should be understood as officers of the U.S.). 
94. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Taming the Shallow State, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/taming-the-shallow-state-by-jennifer-nou [https://perma.cc/ Z8RQ-
MD2B] (discussing limits to bureaucratic resistance). 
95. For example, if a state makes clear that the purpose of its waiver request is to save money 
rather than to advance the purposes of the Act, counseling the state to obscure that goal in 
its waiver request misleads potential public commenters, the courts, and other 
decisionmakers.  The public record suggests that this may have happened at least with 
respect to Mississippi’s waiver request.  See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
Similarly, when career staff that lack the authority to reject a waiver application write 
rebuttals to novel public comments opposing those waivers without bringing those 
comments to the attention of the actual decisionmakers, the rebuttals are likely to mislead 
reviewing courts into believing that those are the reasons the comments were rejected.   
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Second, in preparing analyses of comments received from the public, civil 
servants should resist the common impulse to lump together similar but 
nonidentical comments or to capture only the highpoints of comments making 
many arguments.  Congress and reviewing courts should be able to rely on the 
accuracy and completeness of comment summaries prepared by impartial civil 
servants.   
Third, civil servants should be entirely honest in describing why public 
comments are being disregarded.  If political appointees have determined that 
the goal of transforming Medicaid should override any contrary concerns, civil 
servants preparing responses to public comments should simply say as much, 
rather than inventing objections and explanations that did not, in fact, 
influence the decision.  Although both expertise and political decisions will, at 
times, merit deference, Congress and reviewing courts should be able to tell the 
difference between the two. 
Fourth, civil servants should decline to cut legally mandated corners to 
comply with artificial deadlines set by political officials.  Managers naturally 
should be responsive to political appointees in reassigning additional staff to 
high-priority projects, and individual civil servants should work 
conscientiously on their assigned projects, but neither are responsible for the 
unrealistic expectations of political appointees who may have little experience 
with the machinery of government.  Career managers should be candid with 
political appointees about how long various tasks will require, but if political 
appointees disregard that advice, then the managers cannot be held responsible 
for failing to completely execute all tasks before the administration leaves office.  
If political appointees order civil servants to move forward without completing 
the required steps, the career staff should obey but should not participate in any 
effort to mislead readers into believing that those steps were performed. 
Finally, if anything they write is edited without their agreement to 
misrepresent their views, they should protest immediately and formally.  
Political appointees are entitled to attempt to make policy on their own, but 
they are not entitled to pass their views off as those of career civil servants.  
All of these are sound principles even in ordinary times when 
administrative law is operating within the post–New Deal consensus.  These 
steps take on new, vital meaning, however, when the longstanding norms of 
administrative law are being disregarded.  In such circumstances, civil servants’ 
participation will matter far more because political appointees operating 
outside the New Deal consensus may feel they cannot afford to be candid about 
what they are doing without losing judicial and congressional deference.  
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In the particular case of Medicaid waivers to disqualify unemployed 
persons, the courts’ belief that these are genuine demonstration projects is crucial 
to those waivers being upheld.  A part of justifying that belief is designing 
credible evaluations.  If a civil servant believes that these are not true 
demonstration projects because the officials approving them are not seeking to 
test new policy concepts but rather to change the law without involving 
Congress, then presenting a superficially plausible evaluation is essentially a 
coverup of the true nature of these actions.  Thus, for example, if civil servants 
believe useful policy information cannot be obtained without studying a 
control group for comparison, they should not write rationales for omitting 
one.  If they believe that little useful policy information can be obtained by 
applying the demonstration statewide, they should not manufacture reasons 
why statewideness supports research goals.96  And if civil servants believe that 
an evaluation is failing to measure important health outcomes, they should 
refuse to sign off on any statement to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
At some point, this period of bare-knuckles, hard-power administrative 
law will end.  It is too disruptive and chaotic to serve even the deregulatory 
interests that helped set it in motion.  The same willful disdain that has caused 
this administration to cast aside the post–New Deal consensus that supported 
the soft-power regime of administrative law has caused it to take numerous 
other actions that have alienated voters.  Moreover, the electorate’s disposition 
is too conservative—and too wedded to social niceties—to tolerate this for very 
long.  To be sure, the tumult of the Trump Era could give way to a more 
buttoned-down, organized pursuit of the same goals under a Mike Pence or a 
Paul Ryan.  More likely, however, the next president and Congress will 
resubscribe to the post–New Deal structural consensus, whatever their 
substantive goals. 
The response courts and civil servants adopt to the current conditions 
should provide as little impediment as possible to the revival of efficient 
administrative management.  The approach advocated here—an explicitly 
temporary suspension of deference to political leaders who disregard their roles 
in the structural consensus—is most conducive to that goal.  A weaker response 
that ignores the lawlessness of the current administration could well lead to a 
  
96. See Beno v Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking down demonstration project 
supposedly testing the work incentives of benefit cuts because the state did not expect 
many of those subject to the project to work). 
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search for perpetrators and collaborators once this moment is passed.  The 
President’s repeated embraces of a “Lock her up!” sentiment does not augur 
well for persuading his opponents to refrain from prosecuting all those officials 
implicated criminally in scandals.  They also may seek to purge civil servants 
who appear to have been selected by these political appointees.  The resulting 
upheaval would be messy, expensive, and sometimes unjust.  As noted above, a 
perception that the judiciary acquiesced in executive lawlessness would 
undermine both the courts’ reputation as protectors of the rule of law and the 
rationale for judicial review.   
The goal, instead, should be the modern equivalent of the Act of 
Indemnity and Oblivion that Charles II enacted in 1660.97  That statute paved 
the way for the restoration of the English monarchy after the Puritan 
Revolution had deposed and killed Charles’s father, King Charles I.  It struck a 
balance between civic peace and erasing the illegitimate excesses of the Puritans’ 
Commonwealth, voiding much of the law enacted during the interregnum but 
forgoing retribution against any but the bloodiest Cromwellians. 
Conversely, a wholesale rejection of deferential judicial review not 
specifically tied to the current administration’s abrogation of the post–New 
Deal consensus would impede its reestablishment once the emergency has 
passed.  If courts justify their refusal to afford deference as a broader rethinking 
of the role of judicial review, they may have difficulty finding rationales for 
walking back their anti-deference rulings under more law-abiding 
administrations in the future.  Ironically, announcing a generically more 
intrusive form of judicial review now could slow a restoration regime’s reversal 
of lawless actions undertaken during this period. 
Available precedent, albeit limited, offers hope that a limited departure 
from deferential review is eminently reversible once the emergency passes.  
After the courts savaged President Reagan’s Social Security Administration for 
disregarding substantive and procedural norms in its administration of 
disability benefits, when a new commissioner took office and explicitly 
committed the agency to adhering to the law, the courts rapidly receded into 
their accustomed posture.  Cases that would have prompted angry reversals a 
few years earlier received minimalist affirmances from the same courts.  If 
anything, having trounced SSA during the period when it was behaving 
lawlessly, many judges seemed eager to mend fences with the new, more 
thoughtful agency. 
  
97. J.P. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603–1688: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 365–
71 (1966). 
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Striking down the Medicaid “work requirement” waivers, as the first 
federal court to consider one has done,98 need not destroy future 
administrations’ ability to conduct serious demonstrations of new policies that 
might enhance Medicaid’s performance in any number of ways.  Indeed, by 
removing the need for a future Congress to repeal section 1115, courts can 
preserve and strengthen the authority for genuine policy research.  
As this administration proceeds, the issues this Article addresses take on 
increasing salience far beyond Medicaid waivers under section 1115.  For 
example, the Trump administration is relying on a similar “safety-valve” 
provision in trade legislation99 to launch a massive trade war.  Its claim that our 
national security is impaired by importing steel and aluminum from some of 
our closest allies is no more credible than its assertion that its Medicaid waivers 
are genuine demonstration projects.  In both instances, the administration’s 
public statements make clear that its actual purposes are entirely different from 
those that allow invocation of the safety valve.  If the courts sustain 
disingenuous invocations of the national security exception to our trade laws, 
the only way Congress will be able to prevent a future president from 
unilaterally launching a massive and destructive trade war will be to repeal 
those sections.  That, however, will leave this country without the means to 
protect its national security against genuine threats from our adversaries.   
Our system encourages courts and civil servants to exercise restraint, 
saving their powers and credibility for a rainy day.  Today, it is raining. 
 
  
98. Stewart v. Azar, No. 18-152 (JEB), 2018 WL 3203384 (D.D.C. June 29, 2018).  
99. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012).  
